

Cuba: A Comparison of Work Values on Castro's Island with Those in the United States

By

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In this empirical study of work values differences between Cuba and the United States, the data reveal findings that confirm the expectations of the conventional wisdom on individualism for a comparison between a Latin culture-communist system and an Anglo culture-capitalist system. However, the study findings for collectivism defy this conventional wisdom. Given the dearth of empirical research on Cuba for 50-plus years, this study should serve as a starting point for subsequent investigation of Cuban work values. Additionally, it should provide preliminary information on the Cuban work attitudes and behaviors for U.S. business interested in engaging in commerce in postembargo Cuba. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Few would disagree that we live in a rapidly changing world and that this change can be seen in evolving economic systems, such as those of China, Russia, and Vietnam, in developing political systems, possibly such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as in rocketing technological innovations, such as jets that can carry 800 passengers and worldwide communications through the Internet and other media. However, over the past half-century, one relative constant has been the acrimonious relationship between the Cuban and Amer-

ican governments, as epitomized by the U.S. embargo of Cuba in 1962. For the investigation proposed in this article—a comparison of Cuban and American work values—to be relevant, one would have to believe that the end of the U.S. embargo of Cuba is plausible in the foreseeable future. Thus, some discussion of the embargo would seem warranted as a precursor to these analyses, especially in light of the recent changes in the U.S. administration policy on Cuba (Brenner & Jimenez, 2006; Farley & Thale, 2004).

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Therefore, in the following section, I will briefly highlight some of the more current issues regarding the embargo. In turn, given that some readers may not be well informed regarding Cuba and its history, I will very briefly overview Cuba's history, particularly as it relates to the United States. Then, with the U.S. embargo and Cuban-American relations having been used to set the stage for this empirical discussion of the contrast in Cuban-American work values, I subsequently will introduce two sets of hypotheses based on the cross-cultural values literature, the foundation of which is the individualism and collectivism values. The article will conclude with a discussion and commentary of the findings.

The Current Stance on the 1962 U.S. Embargo of Cuba

In 2004, by a vote of 179 to 4 (United States, Israel, Palau, and Marshall Islands), the members of the General Assembly of the United Nations voted overwhelmingly, for the thirteenth consecutive year, to condemn the U.S. embargo of Cuba. Further, what also appears to be current reality is that antiembargo sentiment within the United States has steadily increased over the last decade due to a variety of political influences (Peters, 2000). Possibly even more important, Cuban Americans, many of whom still have relatives living in Cuba, have expressed growing interest in having the embargo lifted (Rodriguez & Vasquez, 2000), while other Cuban exile groups (e.g., Cuban American National Foundation) still exert their political clout to see that the embargo remains in effect (Askari, Forrer, Teegen, & Yang, 2003; Hays, 2002). While not empirically documented, discussions with members of the Cuban American community suggest that, in general, older Cuban Americans prefer maintaining the embargo, while the younger generation prefers having it lifted. In sum, there are forces within the Cuban American community working both for and against keeping the embargo intact (Maxwell, 2000). However, if this split can be explained by generation (age), then the future interests of this community should evolve toward exerting more pressure for a lifting of the embargo.

Furthermore, outside of the Cuban American community, the momentum appears to be moving steadily toward an antiembargo stance (Erickson, 2002; Maxwell, 2000). At the time of the writing of this article, the U.S. Congress has been pressuring the Bush administration to lessen or remove the sanction imposed by the embargo against the government in Cuba. For example, the United States-Cuba Trade Act of 2003 (S. 403) proposes to lift the trade embargo on Cuba, provide Cuba with nor-

mal trade relations status, and repeal travel restrictions between the United States and Cuba (see www.theorator.com/bills108/s403). In marked contrast with the U.S. Congress, President Bush appears to be willing to veto any action that would improve relations with the Castro government (Marquis, 2003), as exemplified by the tightening of travel restrictions to Cuba in May 2004 ("Cuba Travel Restrictions to Be Enforced," 2004).

Alternatively, we could look at the embargo from the perspective of recent U.S. history regarding the trend of the changing relationship that the United States has embraced with other communist régimes, such as Russia, China, and even Vietnam. In the case of Vietnam, a protracted and bloody war was waged subsequent to the 1959 Castro-led communist takeover in Cuba. Nonetheless, today, as with Russia and China, the United States has normalized relations with Vietnam, even to the point of overtures to assist in the training of its military (Solomon, 2005 <ZAQ;1>). Based on the U.S. government's willingness to reestablish diplomatic and economic relations with these nations, one might surmise that it would be highly likely that the U.S. government would be willing to reestablish relations with Cuba in the foreseeable future. Conversely, it is possible to conjecture that there may be some unique sticking points regarding the reestablishment of Cuba-U.S. relations that are beyond the knowledge of this author and perhaps that of the general public, as well. Nonetheless, a review of known history should assist us in assessing the previous pitfalls, as well as the possibilities of more harmonious future relations between these feuding neighbors of the Western Hemisphere.

An Overview of Cuban History Focusing on Its Involvement with the United States

Precolonial and Colonial Cuba

In 1492, Christopher Columbus arrived in Cuba, and in 1511 Diego Columbus, his son, founded the first Spanish colony in Cuba (Sierra, 2003). In 1762, the English attacked, defeated, and took Cuba from the Spanish. Eleven months later, the English traded Cuba back to the Spanish in exchange for Florida.

In 1868, the Cuban elites revolted against the Spanish after coming to the conclusion that independence was the only way to achieve economic and political freedom. For the next ten years, the Cuban rebels battled the Spanish, but were defeated in 1878. As a result of this defeat, a law passed in 1880 allowed creditors to seize the land of Cuban debtors who were unable to pay their debts. A

number of U.S. companies quickly took advantage of the situation, buying a majority of the plantations from their indebted owners. The rebellion resurfaced in 1895, which stagnated the Cuban economy and destabilized the government. In turn, U.S. President McKinley, fearing that American citizens and their property were in danger, sent the battleship U.S.S. Maine to Havana Harbor. On February 15, 1898, the Maine exploded while anchored off the coast of Cuba. The U.S. public and press blamed Spain, and in an attempt to avoid war, McKinley offered to buy Cuba from Spain for \$300 million. Spain refused, the United States declared war, and in less than three months Spain surrendered Cuba to the United States (Staten, 2003).

The United States had three interrelated goals during its occupation of Cuba: (1) to maintain political stability; (2) to rebuild the economic infrastructure; and (3) to keep Cuba within the U.S. sphere of influence (Staten, 2003). During this reconstruction period, the percentage of Cuban property owned by Americans substantially increased. In 1900, the U.S. government oversaw the writing of the first Cuban Constitution. The United States required the Constitution to include the Platt Amendment, which required Cuba to maintain an “adequate government.” If Cuba did not, it gave the United States the power to intervene (Perez, 2003). These U.S. actions during the late nineteenth century would negatively influence the general Cuban attitude toward the United States throughout the twentieth century.

Pre-Batista Era (1900–1952)

Following the U.S. intervention and Cuba's subsequent break from Spain, the twentieth century presented an opportunity for Cuba to become a leading economy in Latin America. However, after 20 years of strife, Cuba was in serious need of rebuilding. The United States invoked the Platt Amendment to intercede in guiding the selection of the first Cuban President, Tomás Estrada Palma, an English-speaking, U.S. naturalized citizen. This action led to increased anti-American sentiment. Economically, U.S. companies invested millions of dollars in Cuba, resulting in U.S. ownership of much of Cuba's sugar, tobacco, and cattle industries (Perez, 2003). U.S. business also helped to rebuild much of the island's infrastructure, which ultimately resulted in these companies owning much of the infrastructure (e.g., railroads). The U.S. government renovated the educational sector by implementing a U.S. structured learning style that required the teaching of the English language (Suchlicki, 2002).

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economy from reaching full potential. At the same time, a feeling of nationalism was growing, with anti-U.S. feelings and retrieval of the national wealth being the main themes. American racism became increasingly more rampant over the decade of the 1920s as the U.S. presence grew in size, resulting in Cuban politicians protesting the U.S. intervention.

By 1932, daily political murders and bad harvests were plaguing the increasingly hostile Cuban environment. In 1936, Federico Laredo Bru, a man under the control of General Batista, was elected president. In 1940, the new Constitution of Cuba was written. Later that decade, World War II helped the Cuban economic recovery (Staten, 2003). Following WWII, Batista became embroiled in a power struggle that culminated in the *golpe* (coup d'état) of March 1952, which saw Batista take control. Batista's coup introduced a new era with unforeseen consequences for both Cuba and the United States.

Batista Era (1952–1959)

Batista's government gathered instant support when, days after the coup, the U.S. government recognized the new Cuban leadership as legitimate. However, within four months, Fidel Castro began to make his presence known. When Batista's promised election did not materialize, Castro staged his first rebel attack in July 1952. This action began to define the 1950s as a period of civil war (Staten, 2003). Ironically, during this period of civil war,

Cuba experienced its most profitable decade ever (Perez, 2003). In 1953, during another attack, most of Castro's men were killed or taken prisoner. Castro escaped, only to be captured two weeks later and imprisoned with his brother, Raul (Geyer, 1991). In 1954, Batista held his promised election and won by fraudulent means. After the election, U.S. Vice President Nixon visited Cuba to assure Batista of U.S. support. Feeling overconfident, Batista granted amnesty to all Cuban political prisoners, including Castro (Staten, 2003). Upon his release, Castro began to reorganize his revolution (Geyer, 1991). In July 1955, Castro and 82 of his followers traveled to Mexico to begin military training. In 1956, a nationwide student strike resulted in the deaths of many students, creating instant martyrs for the anti-Batista movement (Staten, 2003). That November, Castro returned from Mexico to begin a new revolution (Staten, 2003). Shortly after his return, Castro and his men were ambushed; only 11, including Castro, escaped (Geyer, 1991). During the next two years, Cuba endured a civil war between Batista's military and Castro's guerrilla fighters. During the conflict, the United States provided Batista with military support. In 1958, Castro wrote, "I've sworn that the Americans are going to pay dearly for what they are doing. When the war is over, a much wider and bigger war will begin for me, the war I am going to wage against them. I realize that this is going to be my true destiny" (Staten, 2003). As the war turned in Castro's favor, the United States realized that its support of Batista was futile. In March 1958, the United States suspended shipment of arms to Batista (Staten,

2003). Batista's downfall became imminent. And, on January 1, 1959, Batista fled the country, putting Castro in a position to wage his "wider and bigger war" and to follow his "true destiny" with the United States.

Castro—The Soviet Years

Following the fall of Batista, Castro quickly assumed his position as prime minister. In 1960, Cuba and the Soviet Union signed a commercial treaty and reestablished diplomatic relations. The Cuban-Soviet treaty began a relationship that would span three decades and largely dictate Cuban economic policy throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Foreign investors soon lost almost all of their holdings in Cuba (Suchlicki, 2002). Cuba-U.S. relations became increasingly more strained as Cuba aligned itself with the Communist ideology. In 1961, the U.S.-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion was thwarted, humiliating U.S. President Kennedy and serving as the "final nail in the coffin" of an already deteriorating Cuba-U.S. relationship. Following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the United States imposed an embargo against Cuba that prohibited all bilateral trade, with the essences of this embargo remaining in effect over the past four decades.

Cuba, having exported, on average, 50% of its sugar yield to the United States, was initially devastated by the embargo (Staten, 2003). Throughout 1961, Cuba continued to evolve toward socialism. Late that year, Castro declared himself Marxist-Leninist, while developing a penchant for exporting his Communist ideology. During this period, Castro began to increasingly believe that revolution was possible in the United States. As such, he invited Eldridge Cleaver, leader of the radical Black Panther party, for a visit to offer him training facilities and weapons (Geyer, 1991).

Despite the increasing Soviet subsidization, the Cuban economy was faltering badly. By 1968, all of the remaining private businesses had been confiscated by the Cuban government. In an effort to revitalize Cuba's failing economy, Castro committed the country to long-term agrarian reform, curtailing the country's industrialization. The reform did little to end the recession, and the 1970s concluded with substandard production and marginal gains. By 1983, Cuba had accumulated a national debt of \$3.5 billion (Suchlicki, 2002). By 1984, the pressure to bring the economy out of recession resulted in Castro providing overtures for better U.S. and Cuban relations. From 1981 through 1985, Cuba did manage to achieve 7.8% economic growth, but the national debt remained constant at \$3.5 billion (Suchlicki, 2002). The economic growth was short-lived, and by 1989 the Soviet Union was sending Cuba \$15 billion annually in aid.

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Castro—After the Downfall of the Soviet Union

Following the demise of the Soviet Union, Cuba, for the first time in over 200 years, found itself without the financial and political support of a more powerful country. The Cuban economy contracted by 50% from 1989 through 1992 (Staten, 2003). In 1991, President Gorbachev withdrew all Soviet troops and eliminated the \$2-billion-per-year Soviet subsidy that Cuba had relied upon (Suchlicki, 2002). Cuba, without this aid, was facing a financial crisis that would force widespread reform. It was also a period of substantial suffering in Cuba, with not nearly enough food, fuel, or clothing for its people.

In 1992, Castro declared a “Special Period” that would involve economic reform. Castro legalized foreign investment and the use of U.S. currency. In 1994, the Cuban tourism industry produced more revenue than the sugar market. Subsequently, it has been predicted that by 2010 Cuba will become the number-one tourist destination in the Caribbean (Jayawardena, 2003). Consequently, Castro opened the sugar and real estate industries to foreign investment, resulting in an increase in external commerce from 6% in 1989 to 35% in 1995 (Azicri, 2000). Additionally, self-employment was legalized in a number of sectors, and free trade zones (FTZs) were created in Havana and Marias (Staten, 2003). However, the national debt continued to increase throughout the 1990s, while the standard of living continued to decrease. By 1995, the Cuban government had abandoned its ideological promise of “lifetime employment” and began massive layoffs, with as many as 1.5 million of the population of 13 million unemployed at any given time (Azicri, 2000). By 1996, the national debt had increased to \$10.4 billion, not including the \$28 billion still owed to the Soviet Union (Azicri, 2000). The Clinton White House, seeking to increase the pressure on an already struggling Cuban government, passed the Helms-Burton Act to tighten the restrictions of the U.S. embargo. In 1997, the Clinton administration also announced an aid package of \$4 to \$8 billion to support a transition to democracy, with the hope of encouraging the Cuban people to eliminate their failing communist government.

As we moved into the twenty-first century, Russia and the United States appeared ready to rebuild their relations with Cuba. Russian President Putin visited Cuba in 2000 to announce his plan to reestablish a trade-based relationship. At the same time, the United States agreed to end sanctions on the sale of food to Cuba. By 2001, four U.S. companies (Archer Daniels Midland, Cargill, Rice-land Foods, and ConAgra) had entered into agreements with Cuba to supply food to the country. Later that year,

a shipment of U.S. goods arrived in Havana harbor, for the first time in 40 years. Also, in 2001, the U.S. House voted to lift the ban of some travel to Cuba and offered a bill to send \$100 million in aid to government opponents in Cuba over the following four years (Suchlicki, 2002). Today, the United States is Cuba's seventh-largest trading partner (Luxner, 2004). The Russian story, however, is very different. In 2001, Putin reallocated the money intended for Cuba to rebuild the outdated Russian military and, in essence, cut all aid to Cuba.

The Transition from Fidel to Raul—2006 and Beyond

Fidel Castro has been the autocratic idealist in charge of Cuban policy for over 50 years. Now, younger brother Raul promises to be a collective pragmatist, ruling more like a CEO than a dictator and seeking economic opportunities, even if at some cost to the old Cuban communist ideals—or at least this is the prediction based on the past behavior of Raul as Minister of Defense (de Cordoba, 2006; Marx, 2006). While Fidel has been in the limelight, with a penchant for oratory, Raul has been quietly behind the scenes trying to find ways to make the system work. He has studied both the Chinese and Soviet communist systems and the attempts to transition to capitalism of both Eastern Europe and China (Vincent, 2006). He has come to believe, from the downfall of the Soviet system, that inefficiency and corruption within the system will undercut it, cause the populace to lose faith in it, and ultimately lead to the demise of the system (Wallander, 2003). As such, he has sought to build confidence in the Cuban system of government, although one might debate his success in either creating an efficient or corruption-free government or in creating the perception among Cubans that it is. Nonetheless, he does appear to realize the importance of the populace's perception and has worked, with some success, to get the young generation involved in and enthusiastic about the Communist Party (Wolfe, 2006). Further, he saw in the “Soviet model” of capitalism a frantic rush to embrace these new ideas that may have not been thoroughly thought through. In that regard, as a personal note, while I was in Russia in 1992 to participate in a management development program, sponsored by the Russian Ministry of Science, I was shown a letter that instructed the managers of the companies participating in this program to become capitalists in 90 days—at best, a daunting task, but more realistically an impossible one.

Conversely, in the “Chinese model,” which Raul embraces, he saw conservative order. In essence, the Chinese

model means careful and incremental experimentation with free-market concepts, analogous to very slowly and cautiously opening a faucet, rather than immediately cranking it fully on to let whatever is in flood out (de Cordoba, 2006). Further, Raul has used the military as a resource for his free-market experimentation over the years since the Castros took power (de Cordoba, 2006). More important, realizing that the military is integral to the Castros' success, Raul used his free-market entrepreneurial experimentation with the military as a way to also generously reward the military. Key members of the military were allowed to take ownership in businesses, a crime, until very recently, for the nonmilitary Cuban population. For example, today, Gaviota SA, a military-run resort-management company, controls 60% of the tourism industry, which is Cuba's primary source of foreign revenue (Vincent, 2006). Thus, by giving the military a stake in the future, Raul has helped to ensure the future obedience of the military to his and his brother's cause. Additionally, with the likelihood of Fidel's return to power extremely unlikely, Raul is now permanently in power (Intelligence Brief, 2006). With Raul in power, little is expected to change before Fidel's death, and after his death it appears that Raul will continue to slowly implement market reform in the "Chinese model" that he has long embraced. Although this is seen as the highly likely scenario (Wolfe, 2006), the Chinese model of reform is not a foregone conclusion (Vincent, 2006). On one hand there is the uncertainty of how the military will respond to Fidel Castro's death. A coup, which would provide the opportunity for expanded corruption and wealth for the military, cannot be ruled out; while on the other hand, the large and wealthy Cuban-American community would like to transplant a more U.S.-style economic and political sys-

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tem to their homeland (de Cordoba, 2006). Thus, much of this chapter of Cuba's history is still being written. However, an increase in Cuban-American cooperation, both economic and political, seems likely and is an event for which U.S. business should be prepared.

In summary, the economic hardships that Cuba has faced since the early 1990s, following the fall of the Soviet Union, do not appear to be subsiding. Since the fall, Cuba has seen its material well-being drop precipitously, with faith in socialism following in the same direction. It appears that, to the new generation of Cubans, the capitalist world is more inviting than threatening (Peters, 2000). A similar generational evolution has been documented by Egri and Ralston (2004) for the young generation in China. Thus, if the embargo is soon to fall, as Azicri (2000) predicts, and if some degree of capitalism is the future for Cuba, as Peters (2000) and Wolfe (2006) predict, and as is becoming more likely with Raul in charge (de Cordoba, 2006), then understanding how to work with Cuban businesspeople becomes important for U.S. businesspeople to know. Therefore, in the remainder of this article, I begin to explore the potential degree of work compatibility of Cubans and Americans by assessing the work values of these two societies.

An Overview of the Relevant Values Literature

Comparative Work Values Research on the Individualism and Collectivism Values

A search of the literature indicates that there have been no publicly available studies published on the work values in Cuba itself during the past nearly half-century of communist rule, although there has been limited research on Cuban Americans in terms of business behavior (Peterson, 1995; Peterson & Meckler, 2001). Conversely, there has been a plethora of research published that has focused upon, or at least included, the assessment of work values in the societies that could be described as Latin, Anglo, communistic, or capitalistic (e.g., Egri & Ralston, 2004; Inglehart, 1997; Kelley, Whatley, & Worthy, 1987; Schwartz & Sagie, 2000). Therefore, the logic that will be used to build the hypotheses will be based, in part, on surrogate representatives on this comparison of Cuba's Latin-communist culture with the United States' Anglo-capitalist one.

The business literature on individualism and collectivism began a half-century ago, and thus is fairly well known. Therefore, I shall focus my discussion of these paradigms on the more recent research that follows the Triandis (1995) perspective that individualism and collec-

tivism are two separate constructs and that individualism is a multifaceted construct. This research has shown that the U.S. scores relatively high on individualism and moderately high on collectivism (Egri & Ralston, 2004). Conversely, research on Latin American cultures (Inglehart, 1997) and research on communist countries (Ralston, Holt, Terpstra, & Yu, 1997) have shown that both Latin American cultures and communist countries score relatively high on collectivism and low to moderately low on individualism. Ronen and Shenkar's (1985) initial work on country clusters, as well as later work by Inglehart (1997) and Schwartz (1999), confirms that Latin American and Anglo cultures are different. Also, recent work by Ralston et al. (1997) and Ralston, Nguyen, and Napier (1999) indicates that transitioning Asian communist countries and Anglo countries are different on the individualism and collectivism dimensions in the directions previously identified.

The Selected Measure of Values

In this study, the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) was selected as our measure to assess the work values in these two cultures because it provides a well-developed set of six higher-order dimensions—individualism, openness to change, self-enhancement, collectivism, conservation, and self-transcendence—that are comparable to measures used in previous cross-cultural research (Ralston, Gustafson, Cheung, & Terpstra, 1993; Schwartz, 1992; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988). Thus, the focus of the hypotheses is upon these higher-order dimensions.

Consistent with the view of Triandis et al. (1986) that individualism is a multifaceted dimension, Schwartz (1992) also identifies two of the higher-order motivational dimensions, openness to change and self-enhancement, as facets of individualism that articulate specific aspects of the overall individualism dimension. The openness to change dimension identifies the extent to which individuals are motivated to follow their own intellectual and emotional interests in undetermined or non-prescribed ways. The self-enhancement dimension identifies the extent to which a person is motivated to promote self-interest, even when those interests have costs for others. Thus, when integrated, the openness to change and self-enhancement dimensions define overall individualism. Additionally, the openness to change dimension is derived from the stimulation and self-direction subdimensions, and the self-enhancement dimension consists of the power, achievement, and hedonism subdimensions, as described in the Appendix. Therefore, individualism may also be defined as the product of the power,

achievement, hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction subdimensions.

Collectivism, the other major dimension in the array of higher-order dimensions, focuses upon the in-group orientation of the individual (Triandis et al, 1988). Collectivism is composed of the tradition, conformity, and benevolence subdimensions. Conservation, which identifies the extent to which individuals are motivated to preserve the status quo and the certainty that it provides in relationships with others, consists of the conformity, tradition, and security subdimensions, while self-transcendence, which indicates the extent to which one is motivated to promote the welfare of others whether close friends or distant acquaintances, consists of the benevolence and universalism subdimensions. Thus, while conservation and self-transcendence share common ground with the collectivism construct, they are not pure facets of collectivism, as openness to change and self-enhancement are for individualism. At the same time, there are aspects of collectivism within both conservation and self-transcendence (Schwartz, 1992). Thus, these two latter dimensions will be discussed with collectivism but will not be clustered under collectivism, as was done with openness to change and self-enhancement for individualism.

In sum, the hypotheses to be presented in this article will be based on the six higher-order dimensions of the Schwartz Value Survey and rely upon country profiles, where Cuba is viewed as a centrally planned (communist), Latin American society and the United States as a free-market, Anglo-based society to predict the directionality of the hypotheses.

Hypotheses

As noted, Anglo cultures tend to score higher than Latin cultures on individualism. Likewise capitalistic countries tend to score higher than communistic countries on individualism. Therefore, the hypotheses will follow the logic that indicates that an Anglo, free-market society will score higher on individualism than a Latin American, centrally planned society, with the converse being true for collectivism. Thus, for overall individualism and its component aspects, openness to change and self-enhancement, the following hypotheses are proposed.

Hypothesis 1: The U.S. respondents will score significantly higher than the Cuban respondents on the overall individualism dimension.

Hypothesis 1a: The U.S. respondents will score significantly higher than the Cuban respondents on the openness to change aspect of individualism.

Hypothesis 1b: The U.S. respondents will score significantly higher than the Cuban respondents on the self-enhancement aspect of individualism.

For collectivism, and the collectivistic associated dimensions of conservation and self-transcendence, the following hypotheses are presented in juxtaposition to the individualism hypotheses.

Hypothesis 2: The Cuban respondents will score significantly higher than the U.S. respondents on the collectivism dimension.

Hypothesis 3: The Cuban respondents will score significantly higher than the U.S. respondents on the conservation dimension.

Hypothesis 4: The Cuban respondents will score significantly higher than the U.S. respondents on the self-transcendence dimension.

In addition to these six higher-order dimensions, the SVS, as noted, also consists of universal subdimensions that provide a more in-depth understanding of the higher-order dimensional structures (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990). These ten subdimensions of motivation are presented in the Appendix. The relevant ones will be discussed in more detail in the interpretation of the results. However, the hypotheses will focus solely upon the six higher-order dimensions.

Methods

Subjects

The sample consisted of 322 subjects from Cuba ($n = 150$) and the United States ($n = 172$). All subjects were professional-/managerial-level employees. The data from Cuba came from the Havana area. The U.S. data came from the East-Southeast region. In the United States, a mail survey was used, with a response rate of 11.4%. For Cuba, a mail survey was deemed to not be a feasible approach. Thus, a Cuban colleague with good professional contacts in the Havana area instituted a convenient sample data collection procedure, which we designed to ensure anonymity by having groups of surveys dropped off with him. While a methodological limitation of this study is that identical data-collection procedures were not used in both locations, practicality did not permit it. However, consistent in the methodological approach in both locations was the voluntary participation of nonpaid subjects with researcher emphasis on providing respondent anonymity. Additionally, this limitation should be balanced against having a first glimpse of the Cuban psyche.

The demographic data for these subjects, as presented in Table 1, show that the subjects from these two societies are reasonably comparable on age, years worked, and company size, but somewhat less so on gender, education, position, and industry. Nonetheless, to be comprehensive, all seven of the demographics reported in Table 1 were included in the analysis as covariates.

Measure

Given that Cuba was one of the data-collection sites, a necessary goal of the questionnaire was to keep it as simple and as nonthreatening as possible. As such, the 56 items of the Schwartz Value Survey, along with seven demographic items, formed the questionnaire for this study. Each of the 56 SVS items is measured with a nine-point Likert scale that ranged from opposed to my values (–1) through important (3) to of supreme importance (7). These items were clustered to form a set of ten subdimensions of work values (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990), as described in the Appendix. In turn, these ten subdimensions were clustered to form the higher-order dimensions that were used to develop the hypotheses (Schwartz, 1992).

Design and Analysis

Subjects were given a native language version of the SVS instrument. They were informed that there were no right or wrong answers, and that it was only their opinions that mattered. They also were told that their anonymity would be maintained. The Spanish-language version of the questionnaire was translated and back-translated in Cuba to assure that any language aspects unique to Cuban Spanish were incorporated into the translation.

The first step of the analysis was to calculate a one-way multiple analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) where the six higher-order dimensions—individualism, openness to change, self-enhancement, collectivism, conservation, and self-transcendence—are dependent variables and the two countries are the independent variables. The seven demographic variables identified in Table 1 are included in the model as covariates. If a significant effect was found in the MANCOVA, univariate analyses were calculated for the six higher-order dimensions using as covariates only those demographics found to significantly contribute to the specific univariate model being tested. If no covariates contributed to a model, the univariate analyses were run as analyses of variance (ANOVAs). Significant analyses of covariance (ANCOVA)/ANOVA results provide the data to test the hypotheses. An analysis of subdimensions followed a similar

TABLE 1 Demographic Data for the Cuban ($n = 150$) and U.S. ($n = 172$) Respondents

		Cuba	U.S.
Age:	Mean	37.3	34.9
	SD	12.9	9.1
Gender:	Male	65.8%	57.6%
Years Worked:	Mean	13.8	12.6
	SD	12.3	8.8
Education:	High school degree or less	0.0%	0.0%
	Bachelor's degree	86.7	46.5
	Master's degree	11.3	51.2
	Doctoral degree	2.0	2.3
Position:	Professional	100.0%	41.9%
	First-level mgmt.	0.0	26.7
	Middle mgmt.	0.0	19.2
	Top mgmt.	0.0	12.2
Company Size: (# employees)	Under 100	14.0%	15.7%
	100 or more	86.0	84.3
Industry:	Agriculture, mining, forestry	1.2%	2.6%
	Construction	2.4	4.7
	Manufacturing	0.0	8.8
	Transportation, utilities	12.9	6.4
	Wholesale and retail trade	28.2	12.5
	Finance, insurance, real estate	8.2	39.2
	Services (e.g., hotel, restaurant)	11.8	13.3
	Public administration	9.4	2.3
	Health care	25.9	10.2

procedure to that described for the higher-order dimensions. The subdimension information is presented in tabular form and discussed to help clarify the hypothesized relationships between these two countries.

Results

Cronbach's alpha statistics were calculated by country for each of the six dimensions. All 12 alphas exceeded an acceptable .70 level (Fu & Yukl, 2000; Thomas & Au, 2002).

The MANCOVA for the six higher-order dimensions indicated a significant Wilks' lambda effect ($\lambda = .900$, $df = 1, 5, 270$, $p < .001$). Additionally, the MANCOVA indicated that none of the seven covariates made a significant contribution to the model. Since no demographic variables significantly affected the univariate analyses of the higher-order dimensions, ANOVAs were

calculated for each to determine the significance of the six higher-order dimensions (individualism, openness to change, self-enhancement, collectivism, conservation, and self-transcendence). As reported in Table 2, the ANOVAs were significant for individualism (United States > Cuba), openness to change (United States > Cuba), self-enhancement (United States > Cuba), and self-transcendence (Cuba > United States), with the analyses of collectivism and conservation not finding significant differences.

A similar set of analyses for the relevant seven subdimensions that create the higher-order dimensions, for which significant differences were found (individualism, openness to change, self-enhancement, and self-transcendence), were also calculated. The MANCOVA indicated a significant Wilks' lambda effect ($\lambda = .891$, $df = 1, 6, 268$, $p < .001$) for these seven subdimensions relevant for analysis. The MANCOVA also identified indus-

TABLE 2 Means, Standard Deviations, and F-Test Findings for the Cuban and U.S. Respondents on the SVS Dimensions and Subdimensions

Dimensions	Country	Mean	SD	F
INDIVIDUALISM	U.S.	4.52	0.93	45.56***
	Cuba	3.87	0.74	
• Openness to Change	U.S.	4.65	1.06	25.27***
	Cuba	4.08	0.99	
Stimulation	U.S.	4.25	1.38	24.79***
	Cuba	3.49	1.31	
Self-Direction	U.S.	5.06	0.99	4.50*
	Cuba	4.65	0.99	
• Self-Enhancement	U.S.	4.43	1.00	43.83***
	Cuba	3.75	0.81	
Power	U.S.	3.32	1.48	28.31***
	Cuba	2.27	1.21	
Achievement	U.S.	4.89	1.04	30.43***
	Cuba	4.25	1.03	
Hedonism	U.S.	5.07	1.16	7.42**
	Cuba	4.72	1.16	
COLLECTIVISM	Cuba	4.31	0.75	1.40
	U.S.	4.43	1.12	
CONSERVATION	Cuba	4.15	0.72	2.09
	U.S.	4.29	1.09	
SELF-TRANSCENDENCE	Cuba	5.00	0.73	8.61**
	U.S.	4.70	1.06	
Universalism	Cuba	4.93	0.85	23.55***
	U.S.	4.34	1.23	
Benevolence	Cuba	5.08	0.85	0.03
	U.S.	5.06	1.06	

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$.

try as a significant covariate for the power subdimension and education for the self-direction subdimension. Thus, ANCOVA or ANOVAs were run, as appropriate. Table 2 reports the means, standard deviations, and F-test results for the five sub-dimensions related to the individualism dimension (power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction). All five subdimensions found the U.S. respondents scoring higher than the Cuban respondents. Likewise, the univariate results for the self-transcendence subdimensions (universalism and benevolence) are reported in Table 2. Universalism (Cuba > United States) was significant, but benevolence was not.

Discussion

Hypotheses Tests

Hypothesis 1.

The first hypothesis dealt with the degree of individualism in each society. As hypothesized, all aspects of individualism were reported to be significantly higher in the United States. Thus, Hypothesis 1, as well as Hypotheses 1a and 1b, were supported. Specifically, for the United States, the overall measure of individualism was higher, as were the two component facets of individualism, open-

ness to change and self-enhancement. Likewise, the two subdimensions that create the openness to change dimension (stimulation and self-direction) were significantly higher, as were the three subdimensions that create the self-enhancement dimension (power, achievement, and hedonism). In sum, the hypothesized relationship that the United States would be more individualistic than Cuba was consistent and overwhelmingly supported.

Hypothesis 2.

The finding for Hypothesis 2, which focused upon the degree of collectivism within these societies, was not supported. Although the collectivism dimension was not significant, this nonsignificant finding, taken in concert with the across-the-board significant individualism findings, supports the Triandis et al. (1986, 1988) contention that individualism and collectivism are separate dimensions. Likewise, there are previous empirical research findings (e.g., Ralston et al., 1997, 1999) that support the dual continua assertion, rather than the original Hofstede polar points of a single continuum contention.

A *post hoc* analysis, in which an individualism-collectivism continuum was created, found that the United States scored significantly higher ($p < .01$) than Cuba. An implication of this *post hoc* single-continuum analysis finding would be the misrepresentation that there are real differences in collectivism between these societies when, in fact, the data do not support that contention. The true difference, which lies only in individualism, would be misrepresented by the notion of a single individualism-collectivism continuum—a point that seems relevant to note.

Hypothesis 3.

The hypothesis on conservation was also not supported, with no significant difference being found between the countries.

Hypothesis 4.

The self-transcendence hypothesis was supported, with Cuba scoring significantly higher than the United States on this dimension. However, what is most illuminating is the relative contribution of the two subdimensions (benevolence and universalism) that leads to this significant effect. For benevolence, which is also an aspect of collectivism, there was no significant difference—consistent with the collectivism finding. However, for universalism, not an aspect of collectivism, the score for Cuba was significantly higher. This finding is worthy of note in that universalism has been construed to be a cosmopolitan perspective of the world with a concern for the well-being

...although presently challenging to obtain, a Cuban sample of managerial employees should be sought for future research endeavors.

of others that goes beyond the collectivistic view of concern for family and close friends. Self-transcendence (universalism) also fits the definition of Inglehart's (1997) postmaterialist construct, which typically identifies the most economically advanced societies, which is clearly not the case with Cuba.

Given the limited access that Cubans have been given to the world beyond "the Island," this indeed yields an anomalous finding worthy of future scrutiny, especially in light of previous research findings in other communist countries. For example, Ralston et al. (1997) found that China and Russia, transitioning communist countries with very different religious/philosophical and historical cultures, both reported significantly lower levels of support for universalism than did the United States, the country serving as a common thread between that study and the current one. A conceivable contributing factor to this difference is that the Cuba sample consisted entirely of professionals, whereas all the other samples (i.e., United States, Russia, and China) did have a mix of professional and managerial subjects. However, a *post hoc* test of self-transcendence, using only "professional" subjects from the United States and Cuba, yielded identical results. Nonetheless, although presently challenging to obtain, a Cuban sample of managerial employees should be sought for future research endeavors.

Conclusions with Commentary

In this paper, an empirical investigation of the values of professional workers in Cuba and the United States was conducted, with the goal of providing a starting point for understanding the work behavior issues that would be faced in commerce between Cuba and the United States, assuming relations are normalized. In spite of a tighten-

ing of policy on Cuba by the current U.S. administration (Brenner & Jimenez, 2006; Farley & Thale, 2004), the plausibility of open trade between Cuba and the United States seems appropriate for discussion. The demise of the Soviet Union, a deteriorating economic situation in Cuba, and the pressure of the U.S. trade embargo have been cited as forces that will lead to the inevitable downfall of the failed communist ideology (Azicri, 2000). And, a change in the philosophical perspective of the “new” Castro in charge may likewise contribute to a resumption of trade between Cuba and the United States (de Cordoba, 2006; Wolfe, 2006). Only time will tell what Cuba’s political future will be. However, irrespective of Cuba’s political ideology, it appears that maintaining the embargo will only exacerbate the memories of the acrimonious relationship and mistrust that have existed between Cuba and the United States for the past 100-plus years. Recent interviews that I conducted with intellectuals in Cuba who wished not to be named exemplify this mistrust. A burning question concerning them was the likelihood of an imminent U.S. invasion of Cuba. Whether one outside of Cuba would take this question seriously or not, it does speak to the Cuban perception of the Cuba-U.S. relationship that has been fostered by the restricted interaction the embargo ensures. Also, in the context of the embargo, I found it interesting that in Cuba they were debating the merits for Cuba of the United States lifting the embargo. A question under consideration was: Would the economic infusion from the United States offset the potential loss in humanitarian aid being given to Cuba by

the rest of the world because of the embargo? Both sides of this debate appeared to have merit.

Assuming that the time does arrive when Cuba-U.S. relations are normalized and Cuba has started moving toward a more market-oriented economic system, then if Cuba continues to follow the Chinese model, it would also mean that Cuba would concentrate on regional trade before embarking on a global initiative (Yin & Choi, 2005) <ZAQ;2>. Thus, for a variety of reasons, the United States could be a very important trading partner for Cuba and Cuba a strategic trading partner for the United States (Suchlicki, 2000). And, the question “What will it be like for U.S. businesses to work with the business people of Cuba and vice versa?” becomes extremely relevant. That is, what will it mean for the businesspeople of an individualistic, Anglo-based society, such as the United States, to work with the people of a Latin culture that is also one of the last two remaining pure communist countries (Sullivan, 2005)? This article does not presume to have answered this question, but it has tried to shed preliminary light on this issue by exploring the similarities and differences in individual work values—the precursor of work behaviors—between these two societies (Wolfe, 2006).

The findings of this study contrast with previous research that compared a capitalistic economy (U.S.) with communistic, albeit transitioning, economies—China, Russia, and Vietnam—(Ralston et al., 1997, 1999; Ralston, Pounder, Lo, Wong, Egri, & Stauffer, 2006). The findings of this Cuba-U.S. study identify differences for individualism but not for collectivism. While the Ralston et al. (1997, 1999) studies identified similar significant individualism differences, they conversely identified differences on collectivism, with the United States scoring higher on collectivism than Russia and lower than China and Vietnam. The inconsistent collectivism findings across these four communist countries raises the question of the impact that communism has had upon the collectivism value of a society. Given the number of transitioning and developing societies that have a primarily collectivistic orientation, this question becomes one very relevant to the future. As Ralston et al. (2006) have shown, the values that individuals within a society hold are affected by two sets of influence—the business ideology influence and sociocultural influence. Using this theoretical foundation, we might start to isolate the influence that is primary in determining and defining collectivism. When taken as a whole, these diverse findings for collectivism propose that the business ideology (political-economic) influence may not play an important role in determining a society’s relative level of collectivism, and that it is the sociocultural

As Ralston et al. (2006) have shown, the values that individuals within a society hold are affected by two sets of influence—the business ideology influence and sociocultural influence.

influence that is the primary driver of this value. Thus, communism may not be influential in shaping the collectivistic thinking of a society. However, further investigation of this proposition certainly is warranted. A four-country two-by-two design, with the business ideology influence on one axis and the sociocultural influence on the other, might provide important insights into the dynamics that shape values and business behaviors in Cuba as well as elsewhere.

Likewise, the self-transcendence finding—and, in particular, the universalism subdimension finding—raises an interesting question. One plausible explanation for the apparent juxtaposition of the universalism result, which this data can neither confirm nor reject, is the possibility that the isolation of “the Island” and the historic need for help from strangers that its people have experienced over the centuries may have impacted the Cuban thinking to appreciate the importance of universalism, which is a value typically associated with the people of highly developed economies. However, the veracity of this postulation will also have to be left to a future research endeavor.

In summation, I believe that we have to acknowledge that Cuba is largely an unknown entity to most of those outside of it, as were Russia, China, and Vietnam a few decades ago. Based on a review of the literature, this study also appears to be the first one to provide empirical evidence of the cross-cultural similarities and differences in work values between these two societies. Thus, while this study is only starting to scratch the surface of the Cuban psyche, it is a first-time empirical exploration into the underresearched Cuban work value system and a starting point that hopefully will provide a foundation for future research endeavors, as well as a better understanding of the values that will underlie the business behaviors and decisions that can be expected when sanctioned commerce resumes. Thus, these findings should prove useful to practitioners as well—especially if my sources in Cuba are correct that there are a number of U.S. companies who presently, but quietly and unofficially, are sending their executives to Cuba to lay the foundation for business relationships once official relations between the two countries have been normalized.



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AQ1: There is no Solomon (2005) entry in the References. Please add one or delete this citation.

AQ2: There is no Yin and Choi (2005) entry in the References. Please add one or delete this citation.

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APPENDIX

The Ten Universal Schwartz Value Survey [SVS] Subdimensions

- Power:** The motivational goal of people with power values is the attainment of social status and prestige, and the control or dominance over other people and resources.
- Achievement:** The primary goal of this type is personal success through demonstrated competence. Competence is based on what is valued by the system or organization in which the individual is located.
- Hedonism:** The motivational goal of this type is pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself. This value type is derived from orgasmic needs and the pleasure associated with satisfying them.
- Stimulation:** The motivational goal of people with stimulation values is excitement, novelty, and challenge in life. This value type is derived from the need for variety and stimulation in order to maintain an optimal level of activation. Thrill seeking can be the result of strong stimulation needs.
- Self-Direction:** The motivational goal of this value type is independent thought and action (for example, choosing, creating, exploring). Self-direction comes from the need for control and mastery along with the need for autonomy and independence.
- Universalism:** The motivational goal of universalism is the understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection of the welfare of all people and nature.
- Benevolence:** The motivational goal of people with benevolent values is to preserve and enhance the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact. This is a concern for the welfare of others that is more narrowly defined than universalism.
- Tradition:** The motivational goal of people with tradition values is respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one's culture or religion imposes on the individual. A traditional mode of behavior becomes a symbol of the group's solidarity and an expression of its unique worth and, hopefully, its survival.
- Conformity:** The motivational goal of this type is restraint of action, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms. It is derived from the requirement that individuals inhibit inclinations that might be socially disruptive.
- Security:** The motivational goal of this type is safety, harmony, and stability of society or relationships, and of self.

